Whitewashing Slavery: Legacy of Slavery and White Social Outcomes

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ABSTRACT

Legacy of slavery research has branched out into an important new niche in social science research by making empirical connections between the trans-Atlantic slave trade and contemporary social outcomes. However, the vast majority of this research examines black-white inequality or black disadvantage without devoting corresponding attention to the other side of inequality: white advantage. This study expands the legacy of slavery conversation by exploring whether white populations accrue long-term benefits from slave labor. Specifically, I deploy historical understandings of racial boundary formation and theories of durable inequality to argue that white populations in places that relied more heavily on slave labor should experience better social and economic outcomes than white population in places that relied less on slave labor. I test this argument using OLS regression and county-level data from the 1860 United States Census, the 2010–2014 American Community Survey (ACS), and the 2014 United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS). The results support my hypothesis. Historical reliance on slave labor predicts better white outcomes on five of six metrics. I discuss the implications of these findings for race, slavery, whiteness studies, and reparations.

KEYWORDS: slavery; race/ethnicity; boundary formation; reparations; white privilege.

American chattel slavery has claimed a new place in social science. The widespread availability of historical census data (thanks in large part to the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota), coupled with the return of racial reparations to the fore of public conversations, has sparked a revival in the study of the "peculiar institution." This recent wave of research has been unique as researchers have attempted to quantitatively bridge the gap between historical slavery and post-Emancipation outcomes. Typically focusing on how contemporary social outcomes map onto the geographical distribution of antebellum slavery, researchers have explored the connections between slavery and executions (Vandiver, Giacopassi, and Lofquist 2006), rural poverty (Duncan 1999), violent crime (Gouda and Rigterink 2016), voting behavior (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016), racial differences in educational outcomes (Bertocchi and Dimico 2012 and 2014; Reece and O'Connell 2016), and racial differences in poverty and income (Lagerlöf 2005; O'Connell 2012).

This research has revolutionized how we view slavery's influence on contemporary society by testing direct connections between slavery and today. This "legacy of slavery" research, as it is sometimes called, offers additional evidence that slavery continues to directly affect the social contours of

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contemporary society. But for all of its innovations, this research takes a decidedly one-sided view of slavery and racial inequality in America. Most of the studies focus on how slavery disadvantaged black Americans and how those disadvantages have endured over the past 160 years to influence present-day inequalities. Very little of the literature examines the converse: how slavery *advantaged* white people and how those accumulated advantages may be reflected in the geographic distribution of white social outcomes today. This study attempts to expand the legacy of slavery conversation to include white advantage as a contributor to inequality.

To examine the effect of slavery on white advantage, I use regression analysis and a combination of historical census data and the American Community Survey to test whether stronger local connections to slavery improve white social outcomes on a variety of metrics. The results show that slavery was associated with better social outcomes for white people on five of six indicators, with no association on the remaining one. I discuss the implications of both the significant and non-significant findings, particularly in the context of expanding race and whiteness studies and the discussion of racial reparations.

LEGACY OF SLAVERY
Discussions of how slavery shaped American society have permeated scholarly and public discourse from America's earliest days, and since Emancipation innumerable scholarly works have sought to examine the myriad ways the lingering effects of slavery continued to manifest. These arguments have been primarily theoretical, historical, and speculative but generally reasonable and encompassing nearly every aspect of and every place in the country. Slavery has consistently been deemed the primary culprit in the making of capitalism (Baptist 2014; Ruef 2014), race (Smedley 2012), and even more esoteric phenomena, such as the rate of sexually transmitted diseases in the South (Thomas 2006) and our perception of interracial intimate relationships (Millward 2010). However, until recently, most researchers have lacked the ability to draw direct quantitative connections between slavery and today, mostly because data limitations precluded their doing so. The increasing availability of a wide variety of historical data now allows scholars to engage in a new wave of legacy of slavery research that links slavery and today in nearly unprecedented ways.

This new wave of legacy of slavery research began to trickle through the social sciences just over a decade ago, exploding over the past five years concurrent with a resurgence in public discourse concerning racial reparations (Coates 2014; Nelson 2016). This research has used an innovative collection of data to investigate a range of ideas, but it generally falls into four broad areas: first, a thread that examines the legacy of slavery and social phenomena not necessarily related to inequality; second, a group of papers that examines the legacy of slavery and racial inequality; third, a segment of research that examines the legacy of slavery cross-nationally; and fourth, an area which consists of research that examines intraracial inequality among black people.

The first segment of legacy of slavery research investigates the effect of slavery on contemporary social outcomes that are not explicitly about racial inequality. For example, Vandiver and her colleagues (2006) find that states in the United States that supported slavery account for a disproportionately high number of modern criminal executions. Relatedly, Gouda and Rigterink (2016) find that Southern counties with more slaves living on large plantations positively predicts levels of violent crime contemporarily. Acharya et al. (2016) show that counties where slavery was more prevalent have lower average black turnout for elections, more lawsuits claiming constitutional violations based on race, and more racial polarization in political party identification. These studies offer similar explanations for their results, relying primarily on cultural and behavioral mechanisms. Specifically, they generally argue that slavery shaped local values, political attitudes, and ethics in ways that may have been passed through the generations by a combination of parent-to-child socialization and institutional reinforcement. Along those lines, Vandiver et al. (2006) discuss a "culture of violence" throughout the South that condones violence as a response to problems and thus justifies executions, and Acharya et al. (2016) present what they call a "culture of disenfranchisement" that dampens the

black vote. These studies also demonstrate the far-reaching effects of slavery, particularly how an institution that was so intrinsically about race and racial inequality also shapes the totality of the area's political and criminal justice systems over a century and a half later.

The second segment of legacy of slavery research focuses on how the legacy of slavery shapes contemporary material racial inequality in a number of areas, including education (Bertocchi and Dimico 2012, 2014; Reece and O'Connell 2016), poverty (O'Connell 2012), income (Lagerlöf 2005) and entrepreneurship (Zajonc 2003). This research generally uses county-level analysis and a combination of institutional and human capital explanations. O'Connell (2012) suggests that slavery gave way to future economic systems that were also based on economic exploitation and those subsequent economic systems may have continued to facilitate black-white inequality. Otherwise, she suggests that political institutions in high slave counties may have continued to funnel resources disproportionately to white populations. Lagerlöf (2005) and Bertocchi and Dimico (2014) focus on human capital explanations for the ongoing effect of slavery. Specifically, Lagerlöf (2005) suggests that to maintain these exploitive systems, white people invested heavily in private schools so that they could offer themselves quality education while denying black people similar opportunities. This would function to enrich white people and impoverish black people, increasing inequality. Similarly, Bertocchi and Dimico (2012, 2014) and Reece and O'Connell (2016) argue that slavery shapes inequality indirectly by unequally distributing the educational attainment of black people and white people, including where they choose to attend school. Cumulatively, this segment of legacy of slavery research may be the most intuitive. It maps slavery, an intrinsically unequal relationship between black people and white people, onto contemporary inequality between those same two groups.

The third is research that takes a broad view of the trans-Atlantic slave trade by examining its effects cross-nationally, both on countries receiving slaves and the African countries that were their original homes. The results are consistent on both ends. Countries in the Americas that were more attached to slavery suffer poorer economic outcomes today, while African countries where more Africans were kidnapped and enslaved perform more poorly economically and suffer from a variety of cultural maladies. Nunn (2007a) shows countries in the Americas with a stronger historical attachment to slavery have lower GDPs today. However, it is important to note where the United States stands in these results. Although the United States has a reputation as a massive slave nation, fewer slaves were sold here than in other countries such as Brazil, and the slave population, even though it was quite large in absolute numbers, was relatively small compared to the overall population, peaking at about 12.5 percent, which contrasts with a country such as Jamaica, where about 90 percent of the population was enslaved. Moreover, the GDP of the United States is far and away higher than that of other countries in the Americas. These two factors make the United States data an outlier in studies like Nunn's. Recognizing this, he conducted his analyses multiple times, both with and without the United States, and the results were consistent. In a similar study, Soares, Assuncao, and Goulart (2012) show that those countries also have worse economic inequality, and the relationship between slavery and economic inequality is stronger than that between economic inequality and geography, development, and the strength of public works and institutions such as sewage availability, number of hospital beds, and property rights. Although income inequality may be a net positive for those at the top of the income distribution, it negatively impacts the happiness and health of the overall society (Oishi and Kesebir 2015; Pickett and Wilkinson 2014).

On the opposite side of the receiving countries were countries in Africa where residents were enslaved by traders. Countries where enslavement was more widespread have more stagnant economic development and are poorer today (Nunn 2008a; Nunn 2008b). Moreover, Nunn (2007b; 2008a) suggests that the slave trade disrupted the historical trajectories of African regions that were more developed at the time. More people were enslaved from more developed places, but many of those are places that are, in turn, relatively worse off than African countries from which fewer people were enslaved. This means that the slave trade interrupted development to such a degree that the most developed regions at the time ultimately fell behind their less developed counterparts. In

addition to poorer economic outcomes, the slave trade shaped the cultures of African countries. Countries historically hit harder by the slave trade demonstrate more mistrust today and more negative attitudes towards migrants attempting to acquire citizenship (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Tedeschi 2014). These countries even have higher rates of female HIV transmission, which Bertocchi and Dimico (2015) argue is an unfortunate result of increased polygyny (because a historical disproportionate lack of men made this a cultural norm), leading women to be more dissatisfied in their marriages and more likely to engage in infidelity. These studies show the complex global impact of the slave trade. Though much research focuses on the United States, slavery has demonstrably negatively affected all of the countries involved, either as proprietors of slave labor or victims of slave traders.

The fourth and final segment of legacy of slavery research that I will discuss is research that examines the intraracial impacts of slavery on black people in the United States. This research is usually conducted at the individual level rather than in aggregate as most of the above research is. Ruef and Fletcher (2003) and Sacerdote (2005) examine whether the intraracial status hierarchy between free black people and slaves was preserved post-Emancipation in the form of ongoing material inequality between descendants of the two groups. Both studies find this to be true initially, but over a few generations the gap closed as the social and economic outcomes of the descendants of free black people and slaves converged. Price, Darity, and Headen (2008) take a slightly different approach and examine whether former free black people and former slaves experienced post-Emancipation culture differently. They investigate this idea by testing whether the stigma of being a former slave made black people more likely to be lynched than former free black people. Their results reveal that former slaves were, indeed, lynched more frequently. Using slightly different methodology from that of the previous studies of intraracial outcomes, Reece (2018) shows slavery may have exacerbated stratification between dark- and light-skinned black Americans. In combination, this research continues to expand our understanding of the legacy of slavery, showing that in addition to its cross-national effects and contributions to racial inequality, it also differentially shaped the lives of black people based on their status during the antebellum era.

Each of these research threads makes a unique contribution to our cumulative understanding of how the trans-Atlantic slave trade had long-lasting effects on the world. It seems safe to say that effects of slavery are almost ubiquitous. However, notably absent from these quantitative analyses of slavery is a thorough examination of how slavery benefitted white people, which, ultimately, was the entire goal of the institution. This recent wave of research has considerably deepened our understanding of slavery, building on historical and theoretical understandings, but unlike historians, quantitative scholars have virtually neglected the crucial "other side" of slavery. Additionally, research that attempts to leverage newly available quantitative data to explore how slavery may be connected to contemporary white social outcomes contributes to, and, indeed, builds on, important ongoing scholarly discussions of white privilege and the systematic advantages afforded to white Americans. This article investigates how race making processes resulting from slavery entrenched social and racial boundaries that continued to lift social outcomes of whites above those of their black counterparts— even a century and a half after slavery was abolished.

SLAVERY, RACE MAKING, AND BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE

The idea that chattel slavery enriched certain white Americans seems relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; after all, they literally owned the slaves and the plantations. However, this study considers how slavery shaped historical conditions in ways that benefitted all local white people, not just those who directly owned slaves. I argue these benefits were both geographically contingent, meaning that they vary based on a place's connection to slavery, and temporally resistant, meaning they lasted over time. Specifically, that would mean white people in places with a stronger connection to slavery continue to have better social outcomes than their counterparts in places with a weaker connection to slavery contemporarily.

My argument that slavery continues to benefit all whites in formerly slave-heavy places rather than only (or primarily) the direct descendants of slave owners means pushing past intuitive mechanisms, such as inheritances, to connect slavery to contemporary white outcomes. Although, as the previous section elucidates, scholars take a number of approaches to explaining how and why the legacy of slavery persists, and it is a common point of debate in the literature, I take a boundary formation approach to exploring how slavery not only created and recreated race itself but allowed white people to concentrate advantage among themselves over time.

The formation and reification of boundaries is the response to an institutional need, in this case the antebellum need for a permanent labor force and the resulting need to control that labor force and justify their enslavement (Ruef 2014; Tilly 1998; Wimmer 2008). Our current system of racial classification began to evolve from these needs, sparking a widespread eugenics campaign that sought to "prove" black people were inherently, biologically different from and inferior to their white counterparts, thus making their enslavement not only just but charitable (Zinn 1980). This process is reflected in the progression of the U.S. Census, which conflated "black" and "slave" for its first two decades. To be black was to be a slave and vice versa. Strengthening social and racial boundaries between black slaves and free whites became increasingly important as slavery began to spread across what was then the western frontier into Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and East Texas (Nagel 2003). The number of slaves in the country increased dramatically after Mississippi and Alabama statehood in 1817 and 1819 respectively. The slave population grew from about 1.5 million in 1820 to just under 4 million at its peak in 1860. That is an increase of 2.5 million in forty years after increasing only about 900,000 over the previous thirty years. Moreover, in many counties across the new west, enslaved black people outnumbered local whites, occasionally as high as 9:1. This underscored the need for strong racial boundary maintenance to ensure control over the slave population and consistent and efficient production, which also meant reimagining whiteness from a seemingly loose connection of ethnic groups and nationalities with deep class divisions into a consistent, relatively unified racial identity (Roediger 1991; Roediger 2005; Wray 2006).

While landed white elites owned the plantations and the slaves, they recognized the utility of a degree of white unity in protecting their financial interests (Painter 2010). So while they sought to distance themselves from black slaves, they simultaneously grew closer to other white people. Even immigrants who had previously been excluded from the trappings of "full" whiteness became increasingly incorporated into white society. In return for their unity, non-elite white people gained the psychological benefits of being further raised above black people and the material benefits of positions as middle management on plantations and other jobs on the periphery of the slave economy, such as shipping and bounty hunting (Hadden 2001). In places where there were more slaves, white people would have been spurred to emphasize and strengthen the boundary between themselves and black people.

Though Emancipation may have temporarily disrupted life in slave states, the boundaries formed between black people and white people persisted, even if they were mapped onto slightly different roles. These new roles were similarly hierarchal. The slave-owner or slave-overseer relationships were simply replaced with relationships such as sharecropper/tenant farmer/railroad worker-owner/overseer/manager. This role re-mapping represents the core of a series of processes that allowed these boundaries to remain consistent, or even strengthened, after Emancipation.

First, "emulation" describes the process of importing old modes of social interaction into a new social system after a disruption such as the Civil War (Tilly 1998). Because the same needs existed before and after Emancipation—namely a need for a stable, docile, inexpensive workforce—it was easier for white people to imprint qualities of chattel slavery onto the post-bellum society. That meant recreating old knowledge and social relationships, such as preference for black deference to white people in public spaces (Fox and Guglielmo 2012); repurposing old institutions to serve new needs, such as antebellum slave patrols becoming municipal law enforcement (Hadden 2001); and instilling new institutions with old norms, such as the Freedmen's Bureau convincing many former slaves to remain on their local plantations (Giggie 2007). Additionally, plantation-style violence gave

way to extrajudicial violence as methods of social control, such as lynching and the Ku Klux Klan (Cunningham 2013; King, Messner, and Baller 2009).

Second, working in conjunction with emulation processes are patterns of what Tilly (1998) describes as exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Exploitation refers to the "unequal distribution of rewards proportionately to value added among participants in the same enterprise" (Tilly 1998:88). Exploitation allows dominant groups to disproportionately profit from the labor of other groups. Opportunity hoarding supplements exploitation. It describes the process of hoarding access to valuable opportunities or resources in order to maintain elite and/or privileged status, often ensuring that other groups remain vulnerable to ongoing exploitation. Slavery stretches exploitation to its extremes as the enslaved subordinate group received no profit from their labor while the owners receive it all. This exploitation was complemented by the white population's denying black slaves access to resources, particularly to literacy and education, and occasionally even to group socialization, all of which would make the slaves more difficult to dominate and control.

These exploitative and opportunity-hoarding processes would have continued to be more important where slavery was proportionately more important, because they would have been erected on top of the racial boundaries constructed by slavery that dictated black people and white people should be separate, both racially and occupationally. That means even as the social structure was disrupted by the Civil War or the Civil Rights Movement, emulation dictates that local residents would recreate structures that continued to facilitate exploitation and opportunity hoarding by white people, thus maintaining white advantage and black subordination in ways that continue to map onto the local importance of slavery.

Over time, these boundary maintenance processes would lead places with a strong history of slavery to develop a black underclass (a fact already borne out in other legacy of slavery research—see Bertocchi and Dimico 2012, 2014; Lagerlöf 2005; and O'Connell 2012), a segment of disproportionately poor, less educated, low-wage workers, occupying less prestigious positions. According to Tilly (1998) and Tomaskovic-Devey, Avent-Holt, and Zimmer (2009), when hierarchically organized categories, such as race, are mapped onto hierarchically organized institutional categories, such as occupational positions, inequality is exacerbated. In these situations, the dominant group—white people in this case—tighten their hold on resources, which would improve their social outcomes. The connection between slavery and resource hoarding is evidenced by slavery's positive effect on resource inequality in literacy and quality schooling (Lagerlöf 2005; Reece and O'Connell 2016). In places where slavery was more important, white people were able to leverage their tighter control over local resources into better social outcomes for themselves.

While there is a seeming contradiction between the evidence that overuse of slavery can stunt an economy in the long term (Nunn 2007a; Soares et al. 2012) and the idea that a group can receive long-term benefits from that same institution, that is the nature of a stratified economy. An economy built on exploitation may ultimately be underdeveloped while simultaneously offering profits and status to those at the top of the economy. Meanwhile, those at the bottom suffer. In an economy built on slavery, specifically designed to benefit white people at the expense of black people, growing the overall economy may not have even been the goal. Instead, enriching white people was certainly the short-term goal of chattel slavery, if not the "manifest destiny" of race relations in the United States. Building on that idea, I will test whether white people in locales that relied more heavily on slave labor experience better social and economic outcomes than their counterparts in places where slavery was less important.

Hypothesis: I hypothesize that in former slaveholding states, counties where slavery was more prominent will show better contemporary white social outcomes on six of six measures than counties where slavery was less prevalent.

DATA AND METHODS

My data come from three places: the 1860 United States Census, the 2010–2014 American Community Survey (ACS), and the 2014 United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS) data. Consistent with similar legacy of slavery research, I conduct my analyses at the county level. I include every slave state in 1860 except Oklahoma, because Oklahoma was not yet a state in 1860, so no county-level slavery data are available. That leaves Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, yielding a total of 1,455 counties. I chose to examine only slave states, because this is a test of relative degrees of slavery rather than a test of slavery vs. no slavery. Even among slave states, there was a significant amount of local variance in their attachment to the slave economy, and that is the variance I seek to leverage. This is not to say non-slave states should be permanently excluded from analyses of slavery. They certainly benefitted from the institution, but the pathways were different, which makes a direct comparison of the effect of slavery difficult (Grigoryeva and Ruef 2015).

The focal independent variable is the "legacy of slavery," which I measure as the proportion of each county's total population that was enslaved in 1860. That means that in a county with a legacy of slavery value of .9, 90 percent of *all* the people in the county were enslaved and 10 percent were free. However, matching county-level data from 1860 to contemporary county data can be difficult, because the county boundaries shift, sometimes considerably, over time. Researchers take a variety of approaches to dealing with this problem, but in this paper, I followed the method used by O'Connell (2012) and Reece and O'Connell (2016). See either of those papers for the full details, but, in short, the county-level slavery data from 1860 was reallocated geographically to match contemporary county boundaries. This allows me to conduct analyses without being forced to omit data where the county boundaries are mismatched.

I used a variety of dependent variables to take a broad account of socio-economic status. Median income, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and homeownership rate are relatively standard measures of economic status. I also included the rate of uninsured and the rate of food stamp usage to round out my analyses with alternate outcomes that offer knowledge of people's economic standing. I used the 2010–2014 ACS to calculate county-level values for the white population for each outcome.

Control Variables and Alternate Pathways

I offer four series of control variables that both attempt to isolate the effect of slavery and offer alternate pathways that may mediate the relationship between slavery and the dependent variables.

First, I added a variable for the percentage of the county's population that is black and black squared according to the ACS. A vast literature on "racial threat" suggests local white populations may react to larger black populations with social control measures that may raise their own social standing (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003; Enos 2015; Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 2005; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Welch and Payne 2014). Although slavery correlates strongly with the contemporary black population O'Connell (2013) suggests they actually measure different concepts, and her results support that hypothesis, underscoring the importance of including a measure of both in the same models. Her work, including that of Curtis and O'Connell (2017), also suggests the connection between black-white inequality and black population may be more complex than a uniform linear process, so I also include a measure of black population squared.

Next, I include industry variables from the ACS to account for the way slavery may operate through the way it has shaped the trajectory of local industries. Other research shows places that relied slave labor through Emancipation tended to continue to lean on agricultural and other low-wage labor and eschew industrialization, which may have stunted the local economy (Dattel 2009). I provide variables for the proportion of the local population employed in construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, transportation, warehousing, utilities, information, finance, insurance,

real estate, rental/leasing, professional, scientific, management, administrative, waste management services, educational services, health care/social services, arts/entertainment, recreation, accommodation, food services, and other services except public administration. I excluded agriculture/forestry/fishing/hunting/mining as the reference category.

I then include geographic variables from the ERS: natural amenities and urbanization. The natural amenities scale is a progressive rating from one to five reflecting the desirability of the county's natural features, such as climate, topography, and water. Places with physical characteristics people tend to enjoy living near receive higher ratings than places with characteristics people tend to dislike. For example, a county on the beach in South Florida will receive a higher rating than a county in a desert in West Texas. Places where slavery was popular tended to have relatively inhospitable natural conditions: uncomfortably warm climates, high humidity, often prone to flooding. Indeed, slavery may have shaped the natural amenities of places as plantation owners converted swamps and forests into farmland and rerouted rivers and lakes (Cobb 1992). Over time, such places may see a reduction in real estate values and fail to attract favorable industries and populations which may further dampen the local economy. I measure urbanization using the rural-urban continuum, which is a scale from 1 to 9 with 1 representing the most urban counties and 9 representing the most rural counties, with others falling somewhere in between. The economic woes of rural areas are well documented—high poverty, low education, high unemployment (Tickamyer and Duncan 1990). Slavery was highly concentrated in rural areas, which may, in turn, have facilitated the aforementioned economic maladies.

Finally, I sought to account for local population characteristics, including local high school education, whether the county is experiencing population loss, and whether the county is a retirement destination. High school education is the percentage of adults over age 25 with a high school diploma according the ACS. I measure population loss using a dummy variable from the ERS to see whether a county experienced population loss between the 1990 and 2010 censuses. Similarly, retirement destination is a dummy variable from the ERS for counties where the number of residents aged 60 or over increased by at least 15 percent between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. This series of variables is important for isolating the effect of slavery relative to other economic characteristics. Places with lower levels of education and excessive population loss would have a harder time attracting lucrative industries, which would impede their overall economic growth (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2015). Conversely, retirement destinations offer a unique set of characteristics that signal economic stability, such as higher homeownership and home values, good weather, and low crime (Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf 2003). See table 1 for descriptive statistics.

Analytic Strategy

I estimated my models using Ordinary Least Squares regression in ArcGIS. ArcGIS is optimal for analyzing spatially organized data because it offers tests for spatial autocorrelation, which occurs when a spatial feature (in this case, a county) has attributes that are more similar to those geographically closer to it than those farther away, meaning the observations are not independent. The Koenker Statistic and Global Moran I tool both indicated my model residuals were spatially autocorrelated, which indicated I should present spatially robust standard errors in my results.

I estimated six series of models, one for each dependent variable, in which I introduce each group of control variables in a stepwise fashion to test how each mediates the relationship between slavery and the outcome variables. The first model of each series serves as a baseline to establish a relationship between each successive outcome variable and the focal independent variable—slavery. In the second model, I introduce the variables for black population concentration—black and black squared. In the third model, I introduce the industry variables—construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, transportation, information, finance, professional, education and healthcare, arts, other, and public administration. I excluded agriculture as the reference category. In model four, I introduce

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD
White uninsured	.15	.05
White median income	46656.05	12684.78
White unemployment	.08	.03
White poverty rate	.16	.06
White homeownership rate	.75	.07
White food stamps	.13	.06
Legacy of slavery	.27	.22
Black proportion	.17	.18
Construction	.07	.02
Manufacturing	.13	.07
Wholesale Trade	.02	.01
Retail	.12	.02
Trasnportation	.06	.02
Information	.01	.01
Finance	.05	.02
Professional	.07	.03
Education and healthcare	.23	.04
Arts	.08	.03
Other	.05	.01
Public administration	.06	.03
Natural amenities	3.61	.69
Rural-urban continuum	4.72	2.66
High school	.81	.06
Population loss	.11	–
Retirement destination	.21	–

geographic variables—natural amenities and urbanization. In model five, I introduce population char-acteristics—high school, population loss, and retirement destination.

RESULTS

My results partially support my hypothesis, but they nonetheless offer interesting insight into the ex-amination of white social outcomes that I will elaborate on in the discussion section.

Five of my outcome variables—median income, uninsured rate, poverty rate, homeownership rate, and food stamp usage—support my hypothesis, which means a stronger history of slavery is as-sociated with improvement on those outcomes. The other variable—unemployment rate—did not support the hypothesis as the slavery variable was non-significant. I will discuss the outcomes that support the hypothesis first.

The results of these first five outcome variables suggest slavery may shape white social outcomes through a combination of direct effects and alternate pathways. Refer to Table 2 for the first outcome variable: median income.

The first model establishes a strong relationship between slavery and white median income. The slavery variable is positive and significant, meaning that, on average, counties with a stronger history of slavery have higher white median incomes. However, when I added the black population variables, the slavery coefficient actually increases, highlighting possible collinearity between the two variables, and although both black population variables are initially positive and significant, their significance

Table 2. OLS Estimates of White Median Income in Former Slaveholding Counties

	Model 1 β (SE)	Model 2 β (SE)	Model 3 β (SE)	Model 4 β (SE)	Model 5 β (SE)
Intercept	42586.30*** (476.62)	42399.80*** (482.31)	46979.02*** (11220.45)	67490.25*** (15111.04)	30849.66*** (9346.27)
Legacy of Slavery	15031.90*** (1362.66)	19092.06*** (2805.93)	14133.76*** (1992.24)	11583.07*** (1894.94)	8879*** (1532.38)
Black %		174.82** (64.41)	−49.52 (42.75)	−57.68 (41.75)	−24.65 (35.22)
Black % SQ		−4.69*** (.77)	.25 (.57)	.54 (.57)	1.38* (.49)
Construction			−179.07 (186.82)	−170.37 (213.04)	−394.43** (127.97)
Manufacturing			−301.12** (93.12)	−365.28** (111.78)	−523.15*** (58.56)
Wholesale Trade			878.07** (286.07)	437.18 (339.58)	−69.69 (211.08)
Retail Trade			−799.05*** (149.26)	−865.13*** (171.63)	−1134.89*** (103.40)
Transportation			−28.31 (213.97)	−211.61 (257.09)	−439.90** (141.83)
Information			540.77 (302.63)	300.17 (293.08)	−356.72 (227.70)
Finance			166.62 (148.04)	116.36 (143.83)	93.80 (132.11)
Professional			2533.25*** (147.37)	2089.32*** (206.73)	1327.48*** (151.06)
Education and Healthcare			−294.63* (142.20)	−369.92* (171.60)	−705.80*** (81.84)
Arts			−387.70** (118.68)	−442.50* (142.88)	−815.92*** (85.12)
Other			14.95 (277.19)	−107.73 (307.21)	−475* (193.62)
Public Administration			97.85 (151.84)	84.69 (170.09)	−100.06 (104.35)
Natural Amenities				−1489.45*** (352.73)	−999.96** (317.17)
Rural-Urban Continuum				−991.47*** (159.49)	−826.04*** (104.68)
High School					777.14*** (52.19)
Population Loss					−961.06 (662.38)
Retirement Destination					52.33 (526.30)
n	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
r-squared	.06	.09	.58	.61	.71

p<.0001***; p<.01**; p<.05* (two-tailed tests)

falls away when I include industry variables in the next model. In Model 3, I add industry variables, which causes the slavery coefficient to decrease slightly, even though it remains positive and significant. The coefficient decreases again when I add the geography variables in Model 4 and yet again when I include population variables in Model 5. Cumulatively, this series of models shows that a wide variety of factors are associated with white median income. Not only does slavery maintain a direct effect, it may have influenced other county characteristics, such as the development of industry, geographical features, and population changes that also possibly shape white median income.

The pattern is similar in Table 3 with the white uninsured outcome variable. Model 1 establishes a relationship between slavery and the proportion of uninsured. The slavery variable is negative and significant, meaning counties where slavery was more prominent on average have a smaller proportion of uninsured white people. The black population variables again inflate the slavery coefficient in Model 2, but the coefficient decreases in each subsequent model as I introduce the industry variables, geographic variables, and population variables. Ultimately, like median income, slavery maintains a direct effect associated with improvement in the outcome variable, i.e., fewer uninsured white people, even as it may also operate through other paths.

Table 4 shows the models of white poverty. These models follow a relatively straightforward pattern that mirrors that of the previous two series of models. In Model 1, slavery is negative and significant, which establishes a relationship between the two variables and means that places where slavery was more entrenched have lower white poverty rates today. In Model 2, when I add the black population variables, the slavery variable is slightly inflated, although it decreases in each subsequent model. Percentage black is negative and significant and percentage black squared is positive and significant, but the coefficient is small for both variables. The coefficient for slavery variable decreases but remains negative and significant in Models 3, 4, and 5 as I introduce industry variables, geography variables, and population variables respectively. This means that although slavery may be mediated by or operate through other processes, it maintains a direct connection to white poverty.

Table 5 shows the models for white food stamp usage, which is also associated with better social outcomes in response to higher rates of slavery in a pattern that differs slightly from the previous three variables. The first model establishes an initial connection between slavery and white food stamp usage. Slavery is negative and significant, meaning that, on average, white people in counties with a stronger history of slavery are less likely to use food stamps. Notably, slavery also explains more of the variance for food stamp usage than any of the other outcome variables. Unlike the previous two outcome variables, when I introduce the black population variables, the slavery coefficient decreases, suggesting the black population may mediate the relationship between slavery and white food stamp usage. In Model 3, the slavery coefficient again decreases when I introduce the industry variables, which is consistent with the previous models, suggesting the composition of local industry may mediate the relationship between slavery and food stamp usage. However, in Model 4, the slavery coefficient remains consistent through the introduction of the geographic variables before decreasing again when I add the population variables in Model 5. That means slavery may be mediated by population but not by geographic characteristics. Regardless, slavery again demonstrates both a direct effect on that outcome variable and possible indirect effects.

Table 6 shows the models of white homeownership, which is the final variable to support my hypothesis, and it follows a pattern that diverges sharply from the previous three outcome variables. In Model 1, slavery is positive and significant, meaning white homeownership tends to be higher in counties where slavery was more prominent. This establishes an initial relationship between slavery and white homeownership. The slavery coefficient again becomes inflated in Model 2 as I add the black population variables before decreasing in Model 3 when I introduce the industry variables and inflating again in Model 4 with the addition of the geographic variables. Finally, the slavery coefficient decreases again in Model 5 when I include the population variables. The alternate slavery pathways are difficult to parse out with this series of models, but slavery maintains a consistent positive association with white homeownership.

Table 3. OLS Estimates of Uninsured Whites in Former Slaveholding Counties

	Model 1 β (SE)	Model 2 β (SE)	Model 3 β (SE)	Model 4 β (SE)	Model 5 β (SE)
Intercept	16.59*** (.22)	16.64*** (.23)	30.44*** (5.96)	21.96** (6.07)	37.21** (11.88)
Legacy of Slavery	−4.30*** (.65)	−5.80*** (1.11)	−5.47*** (1.07)	−4.57*** (1.03)	−3.51** (1.06)
Black %		.01 (.03)	.09*** (.02)	.09*** (.02)	.08** (.02)
Black % SQ		.0002 (.0004)	−.0007* (.0003)	−.001* (.0003)	−.001** (.0003)
Construction			.15 (.10)	.13 (.09)	.22 (.12)
Manufacturing			−.25*** (.05)	−.22*** (.05)	−.16** (.06)
Wholesale Trade			−.18 (.14)	−.06 (.15)	.15 (.17)
Retail Trade			−.03 (.08)	−.02 (.07)	.09 (.09)
Transportation			.05 (.11)	.11 (.11)	.20 (.15)
Information			−.91*** (.15)	−.80*** (.15)	−.54** (.15)
Finance			−.02 (.07)	−.01 (.07)	.003 (.06)
Professional			−51*** (.06)	−.39*** (.08)	−.08 (.07)
Education and Healthcare			−.27** (.08)	−.23** (.07)	−.10 (.09)
Arts			−.03 (.06)	−.05 (.06)	.10 (.07)
Other			.10 (.14)	.14 (.14)	.29 (.16)
Public Administration			−.21** (.07)	−.20** (.07)	−.13 (.09)
Natural Amenities				1.11*** (.20)	.91*** (.18)
Rural-Urban Continuum				.26** (.07)	.19* (.10)
High School					−.32*** (.05)
Population Loss					.12 (.43)
Retirement Destination					−.02 (.27)
n	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
r-squared	.04	.04	.26	.29	.41

p<.0001***; p<.01**; p<.05* (two-tailed tests)

The remaining outcome variable in Table 7—white unemployment—does not support my hypothesis. Although slavery is negative and significant in Model 1 for white unemployment, presumably suggesting slavery is associated with lower white unemployment, the r-squared is miniscule, suggesting slavery may explain only a small amount of the variance in white unemployment, and the association dissipates when I include other variables in the full model. However, even though my hypothesis is not supported by this outcome, it, nonetheless, provides a compelling springboard for future research, which I will examine in the next section.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

My results were slightly mixed. While slavery was associated with improvement for white people on five of the six outcomes I tested, it was not associated with the other. This may simply mean that slavery affects certain outcomes more than others. If that is the case, we need to launch deeper

Table 4. OLS Estimates of White Poverty in Former Slaveholding Counties

	Model 1 β (SE)	Model 2 β (SE)	Model 3 β (SE)	Model 4 β (SE)	Model 5 β (SE)
Intercept	18.31*** (.24)	18.70*** (.24)	8.27** (2.11)	1.95 (2.42)	23.86** (2.28)
Legacy of Slavery	−8.70*** (.68)	−8.76*** (.76)	−7.17*** (.96)	−6.23*** (.96)	−4.11*** (.88)
Black %		−.07* (.03)	−.03 (.03)	−.03 (.03)	−.03 (.02)
Black % SQ		.001** (.0004)	.0001 (.0004)	.00001 (.0004)	−.0007* (.0004)
Construction			.04 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.22* (.05)
Manufacturing			.16*** (.03)	.17*** (.03)	.27*** (.04)
Wholesale Trade			−.48** (.13)	−.33* (.13)	−.02 (.14)
Retail Trade			.27*** (.05)	.29*** (.05)	.48*** (.07)
Transportation			.19* (.07)	.25** (.07)	.41** (.10)
Information			−.09 (.18)	−.03 (.18)	.31 (.18)
Finance			.005 (.09)	.02 (.18)	.05 (.07)
Professional			−.56*** (.05)	−.42*** (.06)	.11 (.06)
Education and Healthcare			.30*** (.04)	.32*** (.04)	.54*** (.06)
Arts			.20*** (.04)	.23*** (.05)	.47*** (.06)
Other			−.03 (.10)	.01 (.10)	.25 (.13)
Public Administration			.12* (.05)	.11* (.05)	.22** (.06)
Natural Amenities				.28 (.20)	.17 (.17)
Rural-Urban Continuum				.37*** (.06)	.25** (.07)
High School					−.50*** (.04)
Population Loss					.46 (.44)
Retirement Destination					−.77** (.29)
n	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
r-squared	.11	.12	.33	.35	.55

p<.0001***; p<.01**; p<.05* (two-tailed tests)

investigations into why that may be the case and for whom. Or perhaps white unemployment is more strongly associated with individual level differences than the ecological concerns I investigate here. Regardless, we can be fairly confident of slavery's influence on the other five outcomes.

Despite the mixed results, this research makes important contributions to the legacy of slavery literature. Too many of our quantitative investigations of the topic have focused almost exclusively on who was harmed by slavery without a complementary analysis of who benefitted. Quantitative scholars must follow their historian counterparts in examining how slavery may have benefitted the white population. Chattel slavery was an intricate and brutal practice with a clear economic goal: to enrich the white population. In pursuit of this goal, white people initiated processes that led to the long-term disadvantage of millions of people and many nations globally, but focusing entirely on that disadvantage ignores a crucial half of the story. Indeed, it may bury the lead, when perhaps we should turn more of our focus to examining how groups concentrate and maintain advantage. As we search for effective interventions to ameliorate inequality, disrupting processes that groups deploy to focus

Table 5. OLS Estimates of White Food Stamp Usage in Former Slaveholding Counties

	Model 1 β (SE)	Model 2 β (SE)	Model 3 β (SE)	Model 4 β (SE)	Model 5 β (SE)
Intercept	.16*** (.003)	.16*** (.003)	−.01 (.03)	−.03 (.03)	.26** (.07)
Legacy of Slavery	−.11*** (.01)	−.09*** (.01)	−.08*** (.01)	−.08*** (.01)	−.06*** (.01)
Black %		−.001** (.0003)	−.0004 (.0002)	−.0004 (.0002)	−.001** (.0002)
Black % SQ		.00001** (.000004)	−.000001 (.000004)	−.000002 (.000004)	−.00001** (.000003)
Construction			.002** (.001)	.002** (.001)	.004*** (.001)
Manufacturing			.002** (.003)	.003*** (.0003)	.004*** (.0004)
Wholesale Trade			−.002 (.001)	−.001 (.001)	.003* (.001)
Retail Trade			.004*** (.001)	.004*** (.001)	.01*** (.001)
Transportation			.005*** (.001)	.005*** (.001)	.01*** (.001)
Information			.005 (.003)	−.002 (.003)	.003 (.002)
Finance			−.00001 (.001)	.0001 (.001)	.0003 (.001)
Professional			−.004*** (.001)	−.003*** (.001)	.003*** (.001)
Education and Healthcare			.003*** (.0005)	.003*** (.0005)	.01*** (.005)
Arts			.001 (.001)	.001* (.001)	.004*** (.001)
Other			.00005 (.001)	.0003 (.001)	.003** (.001)
Public Administration			.003*** (.001)	.003*** (.001)	.005*** (.001)
Natural Amenities				−.003 (.002)	−.01** (.002)
Rural-Urban Continuum				.003*** (.001)	.001* (.001)
High School					−.01*** (.0004)
Population Loss					.01* (.004)
Retirement Destination					.0003 (.003)
n	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
r-squared	.14	.14	.33	.34	.61

p<.0001***; p<.01**; p<.05* (two-tailed tests)

Table 6. OLS Estimates of White Homeownership in Former Slaveholding Counties

	Model 1 β (SE)	Model 2 β (SE)	Model 3 β (SE)	Model 4 β (SE)	Model 5 β (SE)
Intercept	.73*** (.003)	.74*** (.003)	.59*** (.13)	.48** (.13)	.39** (.14)
Legacy of Slavery	.06*** (.01)	.08*** (.01)	.06** (.02)	.07*** (.02)	.06*** (.01)
Black %		−.001** (.0004)	−.001 (.0003)	−.001 (.0003)	−.00002 (.0003)
Black % SQ		.00002** (.00001)	.00002** (.002)	.00001** (.00004)	.00002** (.000004)
Construction			.01*** (.002)	.01*** (.002)	.01*** (.002)
Manufacturing			.001 (.001)	.002 (.001)	.001 (.001)
Wholesale Trade			.01* (.003)	.01** (.003)	.01* (.002)
Retail Trade			.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.0001 (.001)
Transportation			.01** (.002)	.01** (.002)	.01** (.002)
Information			.002 (.002)	.004 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Finance			.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
Professional			−.0001 (.001)	.002 (.002)	−.0002 (.001)
Education and Healthcare			.001 (.002)	.001 (.001)	.0001 (.001)
Arts			−.005** (.001)	−.004** (.001)	−.01*** (.001)
Other			.003 (.003)	.004 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Public Administration			.0004 (.002)	.0005 (.001)	−.0001 (.001)
Natural Amenities				.01** (.003)	.008** (.001)
Rural-Urban Continuum				.01*** (.001)	.01*** (.001)
High School					.002** (.001)
Population Loss					−.0001 (.008)
Retirement Destination					.02*** (.005)
n	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
r-squared	.03	.04	.27	.30	.33

p<.0001***; p<.01**; p<.05* (two-tailed tests)

advantage is just as important as lifting up groups that suffer disadvantage. Without the appropriate mix of both, we cannot achieve an equitable society. To that end, this research offers a broad understanding how one group—white people—leveraged an institution—slavery—to generate lasting advantages, but many questions remain unanswered. Particularly, we must begin to test the mechanisms operating between slavery and today to gain a fuller understanding of how slavery continues to shape society.

This work also forces us to expand our conception of slavery in another way. While other research shows that slavery harmed receiving countries in the aggregate (Nunn 2007a; Soares et al. 2012), it is important for studies like this to break apart such large units of analysis in order to complicate that narrative. Although an entire country may appear to suffer the consequence of its slave-owning past, particular groups within the country, particularly white people and maybe white people living in certain areas, may have benefitted. A similar cross-national analysis comparing the relative advantage of

Table 7. OLS Estimates of White Unemployment in Former Slaveholding Counties

	Model 1 β (SE)	Model 2 β (SE)	Model 3 β (SE)	Model 4 β (SE)	Model 5 β (SE)
Intercept	8.57*** (.13)	8.58*** (.14)	−3.48* (1.21)	−5.66** (1.40)	1.82 (1.52)
Legacy of Slavery	−1.02* (.37)	−1.11* (.59)	−1.40** (.55)	−1.11* (.55)	−.82 (.54)
Black %		−.0006 (.02)	−.0005 (.01)	.0003 (.01)	.005 (.01)
Black % SQ		−.000004 (.0002)	−.0001 (.0002)	−.0001 (.0002)	−.0001 (.0001)
Construction			.14** (.03)	.14** (.03)	.17*** (.03)
Manufacturing			.18*** (.01)	.19*** (.01)	.22*** (.01)
Wholesale Trade			.002 (.07)	.04 (.07)	.10 (.07)
Retail Trade			.25*** (.03)	.26*** (.03)	.29*** (.03)
Transportation			.24*** (.04)	.26*** (.04)	.30*** (.04)
Information			.16 (.10)	.18 (.10)	.25* (.10)
Finance			−.02 (.05)	−.01 (.05)	−.01 (.05)
Professional			−.06* (.03)	−.03 (.03)	.11** (.04)
Education and Healthcare			.11*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)	.18*** (.02)
Arts			.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.21*** (.03)
Other			.03 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.11 (.06)
Public Administration			.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)	.21*** (.03)
Natural Amenities				.22 (.12)	.12 (.11)
Rural-Urban Continuum				.09* (.04)	.06 (.03)
High School					−.15*** (.01)
Population Loss					.12 (.26)
Retirement Destination					.71*** (.19)
n	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
r-squared	.005	.003	.16	.17	.24

p<.0001***; p<.01**; p<.05* (two-tailed tests)

the white population in slave receiving countries would greatly increase our understanding of how slavery shaped national economies, perhaps elevating white people at the expense of the national economy or while increasing overall inequality.

On Whiteness Studies, Studying White People, and Universality

Whiteness studies may be closer than ever to claiming its place alongside other racial subfields, and it is important that we continue to shed a light on white social outcomes and seek to further understand the specific factors that influence them. Many studies even continue to present results of relatively homogenous white samples as "generalizable," rather than examining what is unique about the white people. For example, a review of studies of obesity and weight stigma revealed about 37 percent of the studies analyzed a sample that was over 75 percent white, with some over 90 percent white (Pearl and Puhl 2018), and while studies like this inevitably mention their data limitations, writing

that their samples are not representative, researchers still report the findings as generalizable and the studies are cited as such, rather than leveraging a white sample to understand white people.

We must remember white people have social outcomes too. Whiteness studies scholars have repeatedly attempted to drive home the point that white people are not "raceless." They are a racialized population and should be treated as such. By that same logic, white people have social and economic outcomes that deserve analysis in their own right, that deserve to be contextualized in a way other than "See how much better they are doing than black people." Rather than assuming universal outcomes apply to white people and that non-white people deserve separate analyses, we should take the time to understand the factors shaping white social outcomes as well, recognizing they are not a homogenous group and understanding who is disadvantaged, who is advantaged, and why can offer important insights into the workings of race.

This study takes steps in that direction. Even though the focus is slavery, the other independent variables provide points of departure for other examinations of white social outcomes and offers a doorway into the next frontier of whiteness studies.

Legacy of Slavery Research and Racial Reparations

In *The Social Life of DNA*, Alondra Nelson (2016) discusses the 2003 court case *Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston*, which attempted to secure racial reparations for black Americans by suing corporations that they argued had benefited from the slave trade. Activist and lawyer Deadria Farmer-Paellmann became convinced that genealogy could offer a way to make claims for reparations by offering a way to trace the families of those directly damaged by slavery. She thus filed a class action lawsuit against a number of corporations alleging that their participation in the slave trade negatively impacted black descendants of slaves, causing them to lose generations of wages that should be returned. Two of the major barriers the lawsuit faced were the judge's claims that the plaintiffs could not offer direct evidence of injury from the corporations named in the suit, nor could they offer sufficient evidence of a familial relationship with enslaved parties they claimed were harmed. Because of these barriers, the judge dismissed their first lawsuit. The plaintiffs later filed a second lawsuit, this time armed with results from a genetic ancestry test supposedly establishing a direct link between the plaintiffs and the regions of Africa from which slaves were historically taken. They thought that connection would be enough to establish that they were direct descendants of slaves and would give them the leverage to proceed with the lawsuit. The judge disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit again.

The Farmer-Paellmann lawsuit was not the first appeal for reparations for slavery in the United States. It was considered unique, because it sought to redirect the burden for damages to corporations, rather than the state, using genealogy as a basis for damages. Legacy of slavery research may suggest that we return to petitioning the state, using research such as this. Demonstrating that slavery not only continues to disadvantage black populations but also continues to enrich white populations may bolster the argument that financial reparations are a necessary intervention in these ongoing processes. They shift the topic of discussion from tracking the individual descendants of slaves—a grueling, difficult process and a source of constant critique levied by anti-reparations advocates—to the need to reimburse populations. Research such as this, which analyzes local populations and champions mechanisms that do not necessarily rely on a direct slave lineage can be vital for the reparations cause. Moreover, other research demonstrates that the economic outcomes of the descendants of free black people and black slaves converged only a few generations after Emancipation (Ruef and Fletcher 2003; Sacerdote 2005). This further suggests that the processes by which slavery disadvantages black people are more complicated than simply denied opportunities to slaves and former slaves. Similarly, we can infer that the processes by which slavery advantages white people do not rely on a direct lineage of slave ownership. Instead, slavery seems to shape the social and economic outcomes of entire populations through its effect on institutions and norms. This necessitates an intervention from state as it is impossible to attach culpability for the ravages of slavery on a collection of

individuals or even corporations. The very institution, which was legalized and facilitated by the state, and the state's failure to institute lasting interventions to improve the lives of black people after Emancipation are culpable. Legacy of slavery research will be vital to advocacy on this front, and the current paper helps round our understanding of the institution to strengthen these claims.

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